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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

Section 76-5-206(1) of the Utah Code which provides:
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.
Utah Code Ann 76-2-103(4)
With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

2

TABLE OF CASES
AND AUTHORITIES
Ayers v. State, 247 Ark. 174,444 S.W.2d 695 (1969)

23

State v. McAllister, 60 Wash. App. 654 806 P.2d 772(1991)...20
State v. Larsen (2000 Ut. App.) 999 P.2d 1252

13,16,18,19

240 Am Jur 2d Section 74

18

40 Am Jur 2 nd -Homicide-Section 17

19

Utah Code Ann. 76-5-206(1)

18

Utah Code Ann. 76-2-103(4)

18

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution
Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and
Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
1.

Does the defendant conduct amount to criminal
negligence? Defendant argues that her conduct may
be considered negligent civilly but does not amount to
an indifference to human life.
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2.

Is the defendant's conduct the proximate cause of this
fatal accident? Defendant argues that an independent
cause produced the event without which the injury
would not have happened.

3.

In the absence of defining this unidentified force, can the
defendant be adjudged guilty for conduct that she
ought to have foreseen.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This an appeal from the trial court's denial of the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Arrest Judgment, and the
Jury's conviction of negligent homicide. Defendant moved to
dismiss the case based on the State's failure to meet their burden of
proof. This was denied. Post-trial, the defendant via a Motoin to
Arrest Judgment sought to correct this error of conviction—arguing
that the evidence was lacking. This was also denied.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Summary of Facts
Defendant was involved in a two car collision causing the
death of a four year old child. The evidence most favorable to the
State suggests the defendant to pass other motorist crossed into the

4

eastbound lane ( a lawful maneuver). She then moved back into her
westbound lane behind a dump truck.
For an unknown and undetermined reason, her car came out of
the westbound lane on its side, crossing into the eastbound lane and
colliding with the car carrying the young victim.
The reason for the car to turn on its side is undetermined. All
acknowledge the presence of a force causing the car to lift and turn
on its side but no one can determine the force.
DETAILED FACTS
This fatal accident occurred on September 17, 2003. The
accident occurred just west of the intersection of SR 68 and SR 73.
The intersection is west of Lehi, Utah. Page 13 Line 18.
Two cars were involved, a Nissan Altima driven by the
defendant and a Ford Crown Victoria, driven by Wendell Hathaway,
the child's father. The first officer on the scene was Susan Morgan,
Deputy Utah County Sheriff. No independent witnesses exist. Page
22 Line 15.
Deputy Morgan found Jacee Hathaway, a four year old female
in a car seat with significant head trauma. Page 16. She had been in
a car seat behind her father, Wendell Hathaway. Page 21.
Ms Boss suffered a head injury and could not remember any
significant details of the accident. Page 24 Line 12. Page 27 Line 23.
Page 144 Line 22. Page 145 Line 4-10.

5

Deputy Sheriff Ray Edwards was the accident investigator.
Page 21 Line 15. Page 37 Line 4-8. He collected the evidence. He
interviewed the child's father, the mother and Ms. Boss. The father
reported that all he could recall was they were going eastbound and
a car came out on two wheels. Page 40 Line 18-21. He saw the car's
undercarriage.
Based on the information available, Edwards could not
calculate the speed of either car. Page 43 Line 2. Page 50 Line 4-5. He
testified of an intervening unknown force being present—a
launching or lifting mechanism. This unknown force had caused the
Boss car to turn onto its side and lose control. Page 52 Line 17. In the
words of Deputy Edwards, "I don't know." Page 52 Line 22.
He was not initially cognizant that the Nissan had turned on its
side initially. He learned of this event post-investigation. As a result,
his investigation did not attempt to locate this independent force
Edwards concluded, from the information gathered, there was
no degree of certainty about the cause of the accident. Page 52 Line
25. He could only speculate about causation. There was no physical
evidence present to draw that conclusion. Page 53 Line 15-20.
Within three (3) days of the accident, the highway was
reconstructed. Any opportunity to reconstruct the accident scene
was lost.
However, Edwards did conclude that there was no evidence
suggesting she had left the road. Page 53 Line 23. No physical
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evidence was located why the Nissan turn on its side. Page 56 Lines
22-23/Page 57 Line 2-2. He knew that it did but the cause had been
destroyed, removed, and remains unidentified.
The child's father, Wendell Hathaway, testified. He advised
that he and his wife saw a car passing two or more cars in their lane
of travel as he was heading east. He slowed down and saw the car
turn sharply into its own lane of travel. He saw a dump truck in front
with the Nissan behind. As the d u m p truck passed (going west)
them, he saw the underside of the Nissan coming out behind the
d u m p truck. The Nissan hit the Ford. Page 69 Line 6-16. He does not
recall any relevant distance when the Nissan moved back into the
westbound lane. He, however, knew Boss had plenty of time to get
back over. Page 74 Line 12-14.
His testimony comported with Edwards. He did not see the
Nissan leave the roadway nor strike any objects. Page 74 Line 15-20.
He also remembered at least two cars were ahead of the Boss.
Carrie Hathaway, the child's mother, testified. The mother
remembers the Nissan coming over into their lane and hitting their
car. Page 79 Line 18-22. Contrary to her husband, she did not see the
Boss car passing others in the Hathaway's lane of travel. Page 82 Line
17. She, however, did confirm that the Boss car pulled in behind a
d u m p truck. Page 83. Line 10-13. She nor her husband could give any
relevant time period for the Nissan getting into the westbound lane.
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Page 83 Line 16-17. She, as her husband, did not see the Nissan go off
the road. Page 84 Line 19-22.
The State had subpoenaed two accident reconstructionist. The
first accident reconstructionist called was Greg Duval. He advised
that the Nissan Altima driven by Ms. Boss had a high degree of
stability and would not roll over without this intervening force. Page
103 Lines 9-13. This force had to exist. Page 118 Line 10-14. Page 104
Line 1-2.
Without this unidentified force, if the car was going to roll, its
inertia would cause the car to roll onto the passenger side not the
driver's. Without it, it would not reverse course and rotated onto the
driver's side.
However, the Nissan rolled onto the driver's side and then
entered the eastbound lane. Page 103 Lines 23-25. This intervening
force is still unknown.
Duval speculated that if the car had hit a large rock on the road
it might cause the car to lift. Yet, no rock was found by Edward.
{However, Edwards' investigation did not pursue this line of inquiry.
Edwards had not realized that the car had hit something causing it to roll
during his initial investigation. Therefore, he did not try to locate this
force.. Page 56 Line 13). Duval found the damage to the Nissan was
not consistent with it hitting a rock. Page 104 Line 8-14. Page 104 Line
8-11
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Duval speculated that the car may have went off the roadway,
off the paved surface, off the shoulder and out into the dirt and hit
either a driveway ramp or something off the dirt shoulder that had
enough angle for it to lift the car. Page 104 Lines 17-21. However, it is
noted that he never made a physical examination of the paved
surface, the paved shoulder, the dirt shoulder nor any object. His
facts are limited by Deputy Edward's investigation. Page 114 Lines 2225. (This theory ran contrary to the information provided by Officer
Edwards, Wendell Hathaway, and Carrie Hathaway — they did not see the
car leave the roadway and no physical evidence that the Nissan left the
roadway.)
No physical evidence existed allowing Duval, as Edwards, to
generate an opinion referencing the speed of the Boss vehicle. Page
109 Line 14-15. No skid marks existed. No physical evidence existed
indicating the car coming back onto the road from the shoulder. Page
109 Line 22. Page 124 Lines 5-7. The lifting mechanism was not
identified. Page 123 Lines 1-7/Page 108 Line 15/Page 109 Line 5-13.
Duval found no evidence suggesting that the Boss vehicle had
slid sideways. Page 118 Line 21-22. Page 119 Line 17. No evidence
existed that the Boss car had either dirt, gravel, or grass to its right
side. Page 123 Line 23-25.
The prosecution admitted the presence of this intervening
event—the outside force. The State focused on Ms. Boss's conduct
preceding her encounter with this unknown force. (Page 125 Line 18-
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20). He asked if Ms Boss would have encountered this outside force if
she had not been negligent. Duval asserted that Boss had been
negligent in the events preceding her contact with this unknown
force. Page 125 Line 21. No judgment was made after contact with
unknown force.
The State rested.
The defense then called Dennis Andrews. Mr. Andrews had
been subpoenaed by the State as their witness. Andrews is also an
accident reconstructionist. Andrews found that no pre-impact speed
calculations could be made. Any attempt to calculate actual speeds
was not plausible. Page 134 Lines 9-14.
He concluded that this outside force had to exist. The
identification of this force was limited by the investigation. Since it
was not found, the force could not be analyzed. Page 134 Lines 21-25.
Andrews also concluded that no evidence suggesting the Boss car
had moved sideways. Page 135 Lines 3-5. Andrews could not to
determine why the car rolled onto the driver's side. Page 135 Lines 1416.
He concluded:
The event leading to the rollover of the Boss vehicle cannot
be determined from the data collected at the scene.
Witnesses to the collision and events prior to that collision
did not remain at the scene to provide the information
needed to determine what event caused the loss of control
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by the Boss vehicle before it entered the Hathaway's
Page 135 Line 25 to Page 136 Line 6.

lane.

Under questioning by the State, Andrews acknowledge this
outside force was a factor in causing the accident. Page 139 Line 8.
The investigation limited his ability to determine the force or object.
As with Duval, the prosecution asked Andrews if Ms. Boss
would have encountered this outside force unless she had been
negligent. He responded:
I don't because I don't know what the force is. I don't
know what the object is, so I can't relate negligence to that
object. Page 140 Line 8-10. Also at page 141 Line 21.

After the close of the State's case, the defendant sought a
dismissal of the cause arguing that the State had not met its burden
of proof. This was denied. The Jury returned a guilty verdict.
The defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment based on the
same arguments contained herein. This was also denied.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under a Negligent Homicide conviction, a person may be
found criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding her conduct or the result of her conduct when:
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1. She ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur;
and
2. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.

The 'negligence' required in a criminal case must be more than
the lack of ordinary care and precaution as demonstrated here; it
must be more than inadvertence or a misadventure, but rather a
recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for
human life.
The State's evidence suggested that Ms. Boss passed two or
more cars and sharply moved back into her own lane of travel. This
does not rise to the level of a criminal negligent standard—
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recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for
human life.
Further, no accident would have occurred except for this
intervening force. This intervening force is unknown. In the absence
of determining this force, we cannot conclude that her conduct was a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise. We first have to identify this unknown object before
we can declare her conduct to be a gross deviation of an ordinary
person's standard of car.
ARGUMENT
In State v. Larsen (2000 Ut. App.) 999 P.2d 1252, the defendant
was driving a green Ford Ranger, traveling northbound on Wasatch
Boulevard in Salt Lake City. He approached the intersection of
Wasatch Boulevard and 3800 South. He pulled into the left-hand turn
lane, preparing to make a westbound turn onto 3800 South.
Defendant stopped for a red light at the intersection. A witness, J.
Henry Larsen (not related), was also preparing to make a left turn
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from Wasatch Boulevard onto 3800 South. He was stopped behind
defendant Larsen. After the light turned green, defendant waited a
few moments and began to turn through the intersection. At the
same time, Douglas King was driving a blue Subaru Legacy,
traveling southbound on Wasatch Boulevard. There were three
passengers in King's car, including Kara Shinners-Little.
As King approached the intersection at Wasatch Boulevard
and 3800 South, his car traveled over a small hill in the road,
approximately 200 yards north of the intersection. Near the top of the
hill, Wasatch Boulevard splits into two lanes. As the road split, King
moved into the right lane to pass a slower moving car. King did not
look at the speedometer but believed he was traveling between forty
and forty-five miles per hour. King became aware of defendant's
truck moving across the intersection a split second before the two
vehicles collided.
J. Henry Larsen testified that defendant was making the left
turn at a normal rate of speed, between ten and fifteen miles per
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hour. He also testified that the Subaru was traveling at a "normal"
rate of speed for Wasatch Boulevard, estimating its speed at fortyfive to fifty-five miles per hour. As Larsen saw the two cars moving
closer together, he honked his horn as a warning to defendant.
Larsen then watched the Subaru hit the Ford Ranger on its passenger
side, pushing the truck backwards and sideways. Larsen told his
passenger to call 911 and went to see if he could help the occupants
of the vehicles.
Everyone involved in the collision was injured. Although all
four of the occupants of the Subaru were injured, only Shinners-Little
was rendered unconscious. Shinners-Little later died as a result of the
collision.
At the time of the accident, the weather was dry and it was
dusk but still light outside. Larsen could not tell if defendant's truck
had its lights on. King did not think that defendant's truck had its
lights on and indicated that if the turn signal was on it was between
blinks when he saw the truck. King also could not remember if he
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had his lights on. Neither driver slowed down or swerved to avoid
the accident. The truck's tires made yaw marks on the road,
indicating that the tires were turning as the collision occurred.
Defendant was nineteen years old at the time of the accident.
As the officers who arrived at the scene were clearing the
intersection, Deputy Clinton Johnson found a previously opened
bottle of Canadian Host Whiskey in defendant's truck. After finding
the alcohol, Deputy Johnson had defendant's blood drawn to test for
the presence of alcohol. Tests of defendant's blood revealed that his
blood alcohol level was .009 percent, less than .01 percent. At the
conclusion of the trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of each
charge but this Court overturned the conviction.
The Court analysis turned on the Court's interpretation of:
1) Section 76-5-206(1) of the Utah Code which provides:
"Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of
another."; and
2) Utah Code Ann 76-2-103 (4) defining criminal negligence
as when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
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unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.

The Court found that conduct is not criminally negligent
unless it constitutes a "v gross deviation' from the standard of care
exercised by an ordinary person."
Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil action for
damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." M In
State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), this court
explained, " ^[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment resulting
even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the act
makes it so.'"
It must be something more than mere inadvertence or
misadventure, but rather a recklessness or indifference incompatible
with a proper regard for human life

The Court found the defendant's conduct is more accurately
characterized as a serious mistake in judgment. His conduct was not
undertaken recklessly or with an indifference to human life, nor does
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the quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions
were criminal.
Larsen's failure to see an oncoming car which was visible to
other drivers as he made a left turn is equated to Ms. Boss's conduct.
She had completed the passing of two or more cars and had moved
back into her lane of travel. At best, it is a serious mistake of
judgment but does not represent an indifferent to human life.
Further, this tragic accident does not occur in the absence of
this unknown force.
CAUSATION
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that Ms. Boss's conduct was the proximate cause of the accident.
State v. Larsen, supra. See also 240 Am Jur 2d Section 74. The
evidence here was based on speculation and conjecture relating to
the cause of the accident.
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The evidence suggested that an independent force—a lifting
mechanism— caused the Boss car to lift, roll onto its side, and cross
the lane into the Hathaway car.
Ms. Boss' conduct alone does not cause this accident. The
independent and unknown force is required for this accident to
occur. Her conduct may be a contributing factor but not the
proximate cause of death.
In State v. Larsen, supra, the Court stated:
The State fails to show any causal connection between the collision
and the alcohol, unlit headlights, or defendant's failure to activate
his turn signal...
Because there is no nexus between the collision
and the presence of alcohol, the absence of headlights, or inactivated
turn signal, these facts do not support the trial courVs
determination that defendant was criminally negligent....

This unknown lifting force is the cause for the car's loss of
control. The State failed to define this lifting mechanism prohibits
any analysis as to what portion of fault should be assigned to Ms.
Boss, if any. Except for this intervening event, the accident does not
occur.
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INTERVENING ACTS
40 Am Jur 2 n d -Homicide-Section 17 states:
If it appears that the act of the accused was not the proximate
cause of the death for which he is being prosecuted, but that
another cause intervened, with which he was in no way
connected, and but for which death would not have occurred,
such supervening cause is a good defense to the charge of
homicide.

In State v. McAllister, 60 Wash. App. 654 806 P.2d 772(1991),
the Washington Court defined proximate cause:
Proximate cause is defined as "a cause which in direct
sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces
the event complained of and without which the injury would
not have happened." State v. Gantt, 38 Wn. App. 357, 359, 684
P.2d 1385 (1984). . . . Evidence of a superseding negligence
may be material to whether the defendant's negligence was a
proximate cause of the death or whether the defendant was
negligent at all.

There, defendant's wife, Nancy, and her 27-year-old
daughter, Garnett Shelly, drove Mrs. McAllister's 1966 Volkswagen
van to Ernie's Tavern. Mrs. McAllister was the last person to close the
van's side doors. Because the van was old, the side doors were
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difficult to secure; however, the McAllisters had not had any trouble
with the doors opening. Mrs. McAllister phoned defendant and
asked him to meet at a local tavern. While there, the McAllisters
drank beer. Ms. Shelly drank several wine coolers. Upon leaving the
tavern, Mr. McAllister climbed into the driver's side. Ms. Shelly
entered the van through the passenger door. Ms. Shelly crawled over
the front seat and entered the back of the van.
As Mr. McAllister was driving home, he remembered he left
his jacket at the Tavern. He turned left into a warehouse parking lot
on the opposite side of the street in order to reverse the van's
direction of travel, return to the tavern, and retrieve the
jacket. After completing the turn, Mr. McAllister noticed the side
doors of the van were open, and some restaurant grates, which
were kept in the back of the van, had fallen out. He stopped the
van and proceeded to enter the road to retrieve the grates,
whereupon he discovered Ms. Shelly had fallen out of the van
through the side doors and had hit her head on the road. Ms.
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Shelly died shortly thereafter. The autopsy indicated she died as
a result of a blow to the back of her head.
Post trial, the defendant motioned the Court to arrest
judgment as here. It was denied. The Appellate Court reversed
finding defendant's conduct not the proximate cause of Shelly's
death. The Court stated:
Wlten the independent intervening act of a third person was one
which was not incumbent upon the defendant to have anticipated
as reasonably likely to happen, then there is a break in the causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs
injury.
To support this present conviction, Ms. Boss would have had
to anticipate as likely this unidentified force or mechanism. If we
cannot define the force, how can we expect her to do so?
'Criminal negligence' contemplates the lack of such intervening
forces. For the conviction to stand, we must conclude that she failed
to perceive an identified source and her failure to do so constituted a
gross deviation from that imagine ordinary person's conduct.

The lifting mechanism has to be presence, but we are left to
speculate as to what it is and why or how it could have caused the
Boss vehicle to lift, rolled, and go into oncoming traffic.
A conviction cannot rest on speculation.

SPECULATION AS TO THE EVENTS
In Ayers v. State, 247 Ark. 174,444 S.W.2d 695 (1969) the
Arkansas Supreme Court found that where circumstantial evidence
alone is relied upon to establish guilt, such evidence must exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis of guilt.
The facts there, are in part, similarity to this present case.
Ayers had been driving his car and it collided with the car driven by
a Beckwith. The record was not clear as to the exact cause of the
accident. No one testified as an eyewitness to the collision. The only
evidence that either car was being driven in wanton disregard for
others was circumstantial. They were able to make a determination
of the point of impact being across the line by two feet. But they
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were unable to determine which car was traveling which way and
which one was in the proper lane of travel.
When the evidence was unable to identify which car was in
which lane, the Court concluded that the conviction could not rest on
speculation or conjecture. The State failed to meets its burden of
proving the death was the proximate result of the defendant driving.
Here, we have a car that was driving west and pulls in behind
the truck. According to Mr. Hathaway, the car is behind the truck for
approximately 3 seconds and then comes out for some unknown
reason. The Boss car is on its side and at that point uncontrollable.
As in Ayers, we are left to speculate why the car turned on its side.
No eyewitnesses exist. Why the car was lifted on its side is not
known. At best, it is based on conjecture and speculation. We only
know that there had to be a lifting mechanism present.
Lacking the ability to determine this force, we cannot hold
Ms. Boss to a standard required that she ought to have known of this
risk.
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FORSEEABILITY
The State had to prove that she ought to have been aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances existed or the
result will occur. Utah Code Ann 76-2-103(4). This risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constituted a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
How can we charge her with that responsibility that she should
have been aware of this triggering and lifting mechanism when we
can't? Unless we know what the mechanism is, we cannot say that
she ought to have been aware.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the
accident. An independent and intervening cause produced this
event. This accident does not have happened without this lifting
mechanism. This death would not have occurred but for this force.
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mechanism. Without this force, the Boss car does not roll and does
not cross over into oncoming traffic.
To sustain this conviction, the statute mandates that the
defendant should have been aware of this unknown and unidentified
object. Absence the identification of this object, a comparison cannot
be made referencing her conduct or the lack thereof in relation to the
object. For without this object's presence, the accident does not
occur.
The conduct assigned to Ms. Boss of passing two cars and
making sharp turn into her lane of travel does not rise to the level of
criminal negligence. It may have been a serious misjudgment or
error, but it does not rise to a level of indifference to human life.
Dated this 24th day of February, 2005.

SHI
Attorney for Appelant
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